La hibridez de lo necesario a posteriori

The hybridity of what is necessary a posteriori

dc.creatorMiranda Rojas, Rafael
dc.date2020-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date2021-02-04T14:54:57Z
dc.date2020-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date2021-02-04T14:54:57Z
dc.date2020-01-01
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-06T18:26:30Z
dc.date.available2023-09-06T18:26:30Z
dc.identifier0124-6127
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.5
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/15464
dc.identifier10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.5
dc.identifier2462-9596
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8697402
dc.descriptionEl presente escrito propone que lo necesario a posteriori corresponde a un caso híbrido de justificación, sin que ello conduzca a un compromiso racionalista extremo. En los casos de enunciados necesarios a posteriori, los principios lógicos que instancian son de carácter a priori, y la información de enunciados como “Agua es H2 O” o “El dolor es la estimulación de la fibra – c” son cognoscibles solo a posteriori. Para explicar esta hibridez, se discutirá cómo la estrategia vía reductio permite aceptar una aproximación racionalista moderada. Se considerará el bootstrapping como caso paradigmático de justificación epistémica híbrida. La discusión respecto al nexo a priori – a posteriori tiende a establecer una jerarquía, en la que uno de los accesos epistémicos es privilegiado, lo que se rechazará.
dc.descriptionThis paper proposes that what is necessary a posteriori corresponds to a hybrid case of justification, without this leading to an extreme rationalist commitment. In the cases of necessary a posteriori statements, the logical principles that they instantiate are of a priori nature, and the information of statements such as "Water is H2 O" or "Pain is the stimulation of the fiber - c" are knowable only a posteriori. In order to explain this hybridity, how the reductio strategy allows accepting a moderate rationalist approach will be discussed. Bootstrapping will be considered as a paradigmatic case of hybrid epistemic justification. The discussion regarding the a priori - a posteriori nexus tends to establish a hierarchy in which one of the epistemic accesses is privileged, whichwill be rejected.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Caldas
dc.relation78
dc.relation36
dc.relation53
dc.relation21
dc.relationDiscusiones Filosóficas
dc.relationAlvarado, José Tomás. “La noción de justificación a priori”. Discusiones Filosóficas, 9 (12), 2008: 97-122. Impreso.
dc.relationBonJour, Laurence. In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Print.
dc.relationCasullo, Albert. A Priori Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Print.
dc.relationChalmers, David. “Two-Dimensional Semantics” En Lepore. E. & Smith, B. (eds) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press, 2006: p. 574 - 606. Print.
dc.relationCrossley, John Newsome & Humberstone, Lloyd. “The Logic of ‘Actually’”. Reports on Mathematical Logic, 8, 1977: 11-29. Print.
dc.relationFischer, Eugen & Collins, John (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge. 2015. Print.
dc.relationGeirsson, Heimir. “Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification”. Philosophical Studies, 122 (3), 2005: 279-304. Print.
dc.relationGendler, Tamar & Hawthorne, John (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002. Print.
dc.relationHowell, Robert. "The Two-Dimensionalist Reductio". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 2008: 348-58. Print.
dc.relationJackson, Frank. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford University Press. 1998a. Print.
dc.relationJackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip. "A Problem for Expressivism', Analysis, 58, 4, 1998b: p. 239-51. Print.
dc.relationKaplan, Rachel. The Experience of Nature: A Psychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press. 1989. Print.
dc.relationKripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1980. Print.
dc.relationMcLeod, Stephen. “Rationalism and Modal Knowledge”. Crítica, 41 (122), 2009: p. 29-42. Print.
dc.relationMill, John Stuart. System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. En Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Robson, J.M. (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. Print.
dc.relationMiranda, Rafael. “Enunciados de identidad, invariabilidad proposicional y estipulación contextual”. Discusiones Filosóficas, 14 (23), 2013: p. 105-133. Impreso.
dc.relation______. “Enunciados necesarios a posteriori, necesidad débil y racionalismo”. Ideas y Valores, 65 (160), 2016: p. 49-74. Impreso.
dc.relation______. “Sobre el abuso de lo necesario a posteriori” TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO, 40, I, 2017: p. 211-234. Impreso.
dc.relation______. “Rigidez de jure y de facto en los términos generales para clases naturales" Areté Vol. XXIV Nº 1, 2012:pp. 57 – 90. Impreso
dc.relationNimtz, Christian. (2007). Two-Dimensional Semantics – the Basics. Christian Nimtz. Web <http://www.unibielefeld.de/philosophie/personen/nimtz/Papers/pbu03_Nimtz_2007_2dSemanticsLong.pdf>
dc.relationPutnam, Hilary. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975. Print.
dc.relationRescher, Nicholas. “Reductio ad Absurdum”. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP), 2002. Web. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/reductio/>
dc.relationRoca-Royes, Sonia. “Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge”. Noûs 45 (1), 2011: p. 22-49. Print.
dc.relationSchroeter, Laura. "Two-Dimensional Semantics". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophia, Zalta, E. (ed.), 2012. Web <http://plato. stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/two-dimensional-semantics/>
dc.relationSchwartz, Stephen. “Mill and Kripke on Proper Names and Natural Kind Terms”. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 21 (5), 2013: p. 925-945. Print.
dc.relationSoames, Scott. “Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility”.
dc.relationSaul Kripke, Berger, Alan. (ed.), Cambridge University Press. 2011. Print.
dc.relationStalnaker, Robert. "Possible Worlds". Nous 10, 2013: p. 65-75. Print.
dc.relationTahko, Tuomas. “On the Modal Content of a Posteriori Necessities”. Theoria, 75, 2009: p. 344-357. Print.
dc.relationTahko, Tuomas. “A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship”. Ontology Metaphysics, 12, 2011: 151-164. Print.
dc.relationYablo, Stephen. “Concepts and consciousness”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (2), 1999: p. 455-463. Print.
dc.relationNúm. 36 , Año 2020 : Enero - Junio
dc.relationhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/2534/2344
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2020 Discusiones Filosóficas
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.sourcehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/2534
dc.subjectNecessity
dc.subjecta posteriori
dc.subjecta priori
dc.subjectconceivable
dc.subjectpossible
dc.subjectNecesidad
dc.subjecta posteriori
dc.subjecta priori
dc.subjectconcebible
dc.subjectposible
dc.titleLa hibridez de lo necesario a posteriori
dc.titleThe hybridity of what is necessary a posteriori
dc.typeSección Artículos
dc.typeArtículo de revista
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.typeText
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución