Compatibilidade entre holismo e funcionalismo sobre categorias psicológicas ordinárias com uma perspectiva comportamental.

Compatibility of holism and functionalism about ordinary psychological categories with a behavioral perspective

dc.creatorLazzeri, Filipe
dc.date2014-06-20 00:00:00
dc.date2014-06-20 00:00:00
dc.date2014-06-20
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-06T18:25:47Z
dc.date.available2023-09-06T18:25:47Z
dc.identifier0124-6127
dc.identifierhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/756
dc.identifier2462-9596
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8697201
dc.descriptionO holismo (H) e o funcionalismo (F) em filosofia da mente são teses tipicamente formuladas pressupondo-se  uma visão em geral questionada por perspectivas comportamentais. Essa visão é aquela segundo a qual as  categorias psicológicas ordinárias desempenham suas funções de explicar e predizer comportamentos pela  referência a causas eficientes dos mesmos localizadas no interior do corpo. Em outras palavras, fenômenos  psicológicos ou mentais são concebidos como causas do comportamento, ao invés de constituídos por ele.  Neste trabalho, sugere-se que (H) e (F) são, na verdade, independentes dessa pressuposição e, mais do que  isso, que são compatíveis com uma perspectiva comportamental.  
dc.descriptionHolism (H) and functionalism (F) about ordinary psychological categories are typically formulated assuming  beforehand a view in general disputed by behavioral perspectives. According to this view, ordinary  psychological categories fulfill their roles of explaining and predicting behavior by referring to inner efficient  causes of it located inside the body. In other words, psychological or mental phenomena are conceived of as  causes of behavior, rather than as being made up of behavior. This work suggests that (H) and (F) are actually  independent of such assumption and, furthermore, that they are compatible with a behavioral perspective.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Caldas
dc.relation114
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dc.relation99
dc.relation15
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dc.relationNúm. 24 , Año 2014 : Enero - Junio
dc.relationhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/756/679
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2014 Discusiones Filosóficas
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.sourcehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/756
dc.subjectBehaviorism
dc.subjectpsychological categories
dc.subjectfunctionalism
dc.subjectholism
dc.subjectBehaviorismo
dc.subjectcategorias psicológicas
dc.subjectfuncionalismo
dc.subjectholismo
dc.titleCompatibilidade entre holismo e funcionalismo sobre categorias psicológicas ordinárias com uma perspectiva comportamental.
dc.titleCompatibility of holism and functionalism about ordinary psychological categories with a behavioral perspective
dc.typeArtículo de revista
dc.typeSección Artículos
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.typeText
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85


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