No hay una teoría de la verdad como la correspondentista.

There’s no truth-theory like the correspondence theory.

dc.creatorIngthorsson, R. D.
dc.date2019-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date2020-12-09T16:56:27Z
dc.date2019-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date2020-12-09T16:56:27Z
dc.date2019-01-01
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-06T18:25:25Z
dc.date.available2023-09-06T18:25:25Z
dc.identifier0124-6127
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2019.20.34.2.
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/14765
dc.identifier10.17151/difil.2019.20.34.2.
dc.identifier2462-9596
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8697106
dc.descriptionEste artículo desafía la suposición de que las teorías de la verdad pragmatistas, coherentistas, de la identidad y deflacionarias constituyen perspectivas rivales de y son esencialmente incompatibles con la teoría correspondentista, sin asumir el pluralismo. Con excepción de cierta versión de la teoría identitaria de la verdad, las teorías alternativas solo parecen contradecir de manera genuina a la teoría correspondentista, o bien cuando están unidas al rechazo de una realidad objetiva, o cuando se asume que una ‘teoría de la verdad’ es una teoría de la función del predicado ‘verdadero’. Argumento que la teoría correspondentista no debe entenderse como una teoría acerca de la función del predicado ‘verdadero’, y que las ideas centrales de las perspectivas alternativas, una vez se separan de algunas convicciones anti-realistas, se comprenden mejor como perspectivas complementarias sobre diferentes aspectos de un fenómeno muy complejo; a saber, el de cómo nuestras creencias se relacionan con sus objetos y el de cómo razonamos y hablamos sobre esa relación.
dc.descriptionI challenge the assumption that pragmatist, coherence, identity, and deflationary theories of truth are essentially rival views to the correspondence theory, but I do not endorse pluralism. Except for some versions of the identity theory, the alternative theories only seem to genuinely contradict the correspondence theory, either when they are combined with a rejection of an objective reality or when it is assumed that to offer a ‘theory of truth’ is to offer a theory of the function of the truthpredicate. I argue that the correspondence theory should not be understood as a theory about the function of the truthpredicate, and that the core ideas of the alternative views, once separated from any anti-realist convictions, are best understood as complementary views about different aspects of a fairly complex phenomenon, notably of how our beliefs relate to their subject matter and how we reason and talk about that relation.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de Caldas
dc.relation41
dc.relation34
dc.relation15
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dc.relationNúm. 34 , Año 2019 : Enero - Junio
dc.relationhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/162/123
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2019 R. D. Ingthorsson
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsEsta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
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dc.sourcehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/162
dc.subjectcorrespondence theory of truth
dc.subjectcoherence theory of truth
dc.subjectdeflationary theory of truth
dc.subjectpragmatist theory of truth
dc.subjectidentity theory of truth
dc.subjectalethic pluralism
dc.subjectteoría correspondentista de la verdad
dc.subjectteoría coherentista de la verdad
dc.subjectteoría deflacionaria de la verdad
dc.subjectteoría pragmatista de la verdad
dc.subjectteoría identitaria de la verdad
dc.subjectpluralismo alético
dc.titleNo hay una teoría de la verdad como la correspondentista.
dc.titleThere’s no truth-theory like the correspondence theory.
dc.typeSección Artículos
dc.typeArtículo de revista
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.typeText
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85


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