Sellars y la pretensión en “verdad y ‘correspondencia’” (con un desvío a través de la atribución del significado).

Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution).

dc.creatorArmour Garb, Bradley
dc.creatorWoodbridge, James A.
dc.date2012-12-21 00:00:00
dc.date2012-12-21 00:00:00
dc.date2012-12-21
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-06T18:16:52Z
dc.date.available2023-09-06T18:16:52Z
dc.identifier0124-6127
dc.identifierhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/671
dc.identifier2462-9596
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8694666
dc.descriptionLa explicación de la verdad que Wilfrid Sellars ofrece en su artículo “Verdad y ‘ ‘correspondencia’”, nos  presenta una aparente tensión interna entre dos aspectos supuestamente incompatibles con sus puntos de  vista sobre la verdad. Para resolver plenamente esta tensión, es necesario tener en cuenta una explicación de la atribución de significado. Creemos que la explicación que Sellars ofrece, sobre todo en “El significado  como clasificación funcional”, incluye los elementos básicos necesarios para resolver la tensión interna en su  explicación de la verdad, sin embargo, sus puntos de vista sufren de una aparente tensión externa, con  respecto a un supuesto conflicto entre su explicación y nuestras prácticas lingüísticas e inferenciales con la  expresión ‘significa’.  En este artículo, mostramos cómo la tensión interna en la comprensión de Sellars de la  verdad, así como la tensión externa en su explicación de la atribución de significado se puede resolver sin  perder de vista el espíritu sellarsiano, apelando a las particulares explicaciones ficcionalistas de habla sobre la verdad y habla proposicional (incluida la atribución de significado) que hemos desarrollado en otro lugar.
dc.descriptionThe account of truth that Wilfrid Sellars offers in his paper, “Truth and ‘Correspondence’”, presents us with  an apparent internal tension between two seemingly incompatible aspects of his views on truth. To fully  resolve this tension, it is necessary to factor in an account of meaning attribution. We think that the account  Sellars offers, most centrally in “Meaning as Functional Classification”, includes the basic elements required  for resolving the internal tension in his account of truth, but here his views suffer from an apparent external  tension, regarding an apparent conflict between his account and our actual linguistic and inferential practices with the expression ‘means’.  In this paper, we show how the internal tension in Sellars’s understanding of  truth, as well as the external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to  a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition talk  (including meaningattribution) that we have developed elsewhere.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de Caldas
dc.relation63
dc.relation21
dc.relation33
dc.relation13
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dc.relationNúm. 21 , Año 2012 : Julio - Diciembre
dc.relationhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/671/594
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2012 Discusiones Filosóficas
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.sourcehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/671
dc.subjectdeflationism
dc.subjectfictionalism
dc.subjectmeaning attribution
dc.subjectpretense
dc.subjectproposition-talk
dc.subjecttruth-talk
dc.subjectDeflacionismo
dc.subjectficcionalismo
dc.subjectpretensión
dc.subjectatribución del significado
dc.subjecthabla proposicional
dc.subjecthabla sobre la verdad
dc.titleSellars y la pretensión en “verdad y ‘correspondencia’” (con un desvío a través de la atribución del significado).
dc.titleSellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution).
dc.typeArtículo de revista
dc.typeSección Artículos
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.typeText
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85


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