The instrumentalization of the energy sector under Putin- Medvedev (2000-2018) and the Russian return to the international geopolitical scenario
La instrumentalización del sector energético bajo Putin-Medvedev (2000-2018) y el regreso ruso al tablero geopolítico internacional;
A instrumentalização do setor energético sob Putin-Medvedev (2000-2018) e o retorno russo ao tabuleiro geopolítico internacional
dc.creator | Albuquerque, Fernanda Patrícia Silva | |
dc.creator | Carvalho Pacheco, Cristina | |
dc.creator | Cunha Leite, Alexandre Cesar | |
dc.creator | Fuccille, Alexandre | |
dc.date | 2021-05-07 | |
dc.date | 2023-03-22T19:12:57Z | |
dc.date | 2023-03-22T19:12:57Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-09-06T17:46:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-09-06T17:46:32Z | |
dc.identifier | https://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/4764 | |
dc.identifier | 10.18359/ries.4764 | |
dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10654/43566 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8692750 | |
dc.description | In 2020, Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency of Russia with the mission of reclaiming the economy and reinserting the country into the group of nations classified as an international power. Among the strategic areas contemplated, the energy sector stands out. The former KGB agent implemented an energy policy based on the rescue of state control over natural resources and the use of energy companies as an instrument for achieving national interests. In this context, the purpose of the article is to present the energy policy implemented by Putin-Medvedev from 2000 to 2018, who alternated in the country's government, either as president, either as prime minister, but with clear ancestry of the former over the second. The text is structured in three parts: the first, on the renationalization of energy companies; the second, on the development of this sector — by attracting foreign investment and modernizing the infrastructure; and the third, which addresses the use of energy resources as a tool of the foreign policy. It is concluded that the Kremlin regained control of the largest energy companies and used them to maintain its traditional sphere of influence in Euroasia and establish energy cooperation with its major global customers, contributing to Russian economic recovery and international prominence. | |
dc.description | En el 2020, Vladimir Putin asume la presidencia de Rusia con la misión de recuperar la economía y reinsertar el país en el grupo de naciones clasificadas como potencia internacional. Entre las áreas estratégicas contempladas, se destaca el sector energético. El exagente de la KGB implementó una política energética basada en el rescate del control estatal de los recursos naturales y el uso de las compañías energéticas como instrumento para la consecución de los intereses nacionales. En este contexto, el propósito del artículo es presentar la política energética implementada por Putin-Medvedev del 2000 al 2018, quienes se alternaron en la conducción del país, ya sea como presidente, ya sea como primer ministro, pero con clara ascendencia del primero sobre el segundo. El texto está estructurado en tres partes: la primera, sobre la renacionalización de las compañías del sector energético; la segunda, sobre el desarrollo de este sector — mediante atracción de la inversión extranjera y la modernización de la infraestructura —; y la tercera, que aborda la utilización de los recursos energéticos como herramienta de la política externa. Se concluye que el Kremlin recuperó el control de las compañías energéticas más grandes y las utilizó para mantener su tradicional esfera de influencia en la Euroasia y establecer cooperaciones energéticas con sus principales clientes mundiales, lo que contribuye para la recuperación económica rusa y un protagonismo internacional. | |
dc.description | Em 2000, Vladimir Putin assume a presidência da Rússia com a missão de recuperar a economia e reinserir o país no rol de nações classificadas como potência internacional. Entre as áreas estratégicas contempladas, destaca-se o setor energético. O ex-agente da KGB implementou uma política energética baseada no resgate do controle estatal sobre os recursos naturais e no uso das companhias energéticas como instrumento para a consecução dos interesses nacionais. Nesse contexto, o objetivo deste artigo é apresentar a política energética implementada por Putin-Medvedev de 2000 a 2018, os quais se alternaram na condução do país ora como presidente, ora como primeiro-ministro, mas com clara ascendência do primeiro sobre o segundo. O texto está estruturado em três partes, que tratam (1) da renacionalização das companhias do setor energético, (2) do desenvol- vimento desse setor — via atração de investimento estrangeiro e modernização da infraestrutura — e, finalmente, (3) da utilização dos recursos energéticos como ferramenta de política externa. Conclui-se que o Kremlin recuperou o controle das maiores companhias energéticas e as utilizou para manter sua tradicional esfera de influência na Eurásia e estabelecer cooperações energéticas com seus principais clientes mundiais, contribuindo, dessa forma, para a recuperação econômica russa e um maior protagonismo internacional. | |
dc.format | text/xml | |
dc.format | application/pdf | |
dc.language | por | |
dc.publisher | Universidad Militar Nueva Granada | |
dc.relation | https://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/4764/4681 | |
dc.relation | https://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/4764/4693 | |
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dc.rights | Derechos de autor 2021 Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad | |
dc.source | Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol. 16 No. 1 (2021); 125–152 | |
dc.source | Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol. 16 Núm. 1 (2021); 125–152 | |
dc.source | Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; v. 16 n. 1 (2021); 125–152 | |
dc.source | 1909-7743 | |
dc.source | 1909-3063 | |
dc.title | The instrumentalization of the energy sector under Putin- Medvedev (2000-2018) and the Russian return to the international geopolitical scenario | |
dc.title | La instrumentalización del sector energético bajo Putin-Medvedev (2000-2018) y el regreso ruso al tablero geopolítico internacional | |
dc.title | A instrumentalização do setor energético sob Putin-Medvedev (2000-2018) e o retorno russo ao tabuleiro geopolítico internacional | |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |