Personal Status in Intellectual Disability: Considering Cognitive Abilities

Estatus personal en la discapacidad intelectual: considerando las capacidades cognitivas;
Status pessoal na deficiência intelectual: considerando habilidades cognitivas

dc.creatorEnríquez Canto, Yordanis
dc.date2018-06-08
dc.date2023-03-22T19:06:10Z
dc.date2023-03-22T19:06:10Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-06T17:43:50Z
dc.date.available2023-09-06T17:43:50Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/rlbi/article/view/3137
dc.identifier10.18359/rlbi.3137
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10654/43377
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8692493
dc.descriptionSome bioethical approaches consider rationality as central to the notion of person. Jeff McMahan subordinates the personal condition to cognitive abilities; consequently, an individual having an intellectual disability is not considered a person. The notion of person is key to general bioethics and to upholding treaties and conventions. The model considered influences clinical bioethics because biomedical practice deduces rules from theoretical reflections. The article examines the cognitive abilities criterion to determine the personal status in intellectual disability using criticism to the ideal theory, based on which we identified problems in the idealization of abilities. Subsequently, we describe intellectual disability and how it is confirmed by Jeff McMahan’s conceptualizations and analyze four main limitations of the cognitive abilities criterion to establish personal condition. Finally, it is argued that corporeality complements the models that describe the human person in bioethics. The cognitive abilities criterion should not be considered normative since corporeality determines the loss of our abilities and exposes us to disability itself.
dc.descriptionAlgunos enfoques bioéticos consideran central la racionalidad en la noción de persona. Jeff McMahan supedita la condición personal a las capacidades cognitivas, por consecuencia quien presenta discapacidad intelectual no es considerado persona. La noción de persona es central en la Bioética general y medular en la fundamentación de tratados y convenciones. El modelo considerado influye en la bioética clínica, ya que la práctica biomédica deduce normas a partir de reflexiones teóricas. El artículo examina el criterio de las capacidades cognitivas para determinar la condición personal en la discapacidad intelectual empleando la crítica a la teoría ideal. A tal fin, se parte de las críticas a la teoría ideal identificando problemas en la idealización de capacidades. Posteriormente se describe la discapacidad intelectual y cómo esta es contrastada por las conceptualizaciones de Jeff McMahan. Seguidamente se realiza un análisis de cuatro limitaciones del criterio de las capacidades cognitivas para establecer la condición personal. Por último, se argumenta que la corporeidad complementa los modelos que en Bioética describen la persona humana. El criterio de las capacidades cognitivas no debe considerarse normativo puesto que la corporeidad condiciona la pérdida de nuestras capacidades y expone a la discapacidad misma.
dc.descriptionAlgumas abordagens bioéticas consideram a racionalidade como central para a noção de pessoa. Jeff McMahan subordina a condição pessoal às habilidades cognitivas; consequentemente, quem apresenta deficiência intelectual não é considerado uma pessoa. A noção de pessoa é central para a bioética geral e para a fundação de tratados e convenções. O modelo considerado influencia a bioética clínica, uma vez que a prática biomédica deduz normas de reflexões teóricas. Este artigo examina o critério das habilidades cognitivas para determinar a condição pessoal na deficiência intelectual usando a crítica à teoria ideal. Para tanto, parte da crítica à teoria ideal ao identificar problemas na idealização de capacidades. Posteriormente, a deficiência intelectual é descrita e como ela é contrastada pelas conceituações de Jeff McMahan. Em seguida, faz-se uma análise das quatro principais limitações do critério das habilidades cognitivas para establecer a condição pessoal. Por fim, argumenta-se que a corporeidade complementa os modelos que, na bioética, descrevem a pessoa humana. O critério de habilidades cognitivas não debe ser considerado normativo, uma vez que a corporalidade pode determinar a perda de nossas habilidades e expor a própria incapacidade.
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dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Militar Nueva Granada
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/rlbi/article/view/3137/2900
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/rlbi/article/view/3137/3050
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dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2018 Revista Latinoamericana de Bioética
dc.sourceRevista Latinoamericana de Bioética; Vol. 18 Núm. 35-2 (2018): GÉNERO Y BIOÉTICA: ENTRE DISCURSOS E IDEOLOGÍAS; 226-241
dc.source2462-859X
dc.source1657-4702
dc.subjectCognition
dc.subjectcognitive abilities
dc.subjecthuman body
dc.subjectintellectual disability
dc.subjectDiscapacidad intelectual
dc.subjectcognición
dc.subjectcuerpo humano
dc.subjectcapacidades cognitivas
dc.subjectDeficiência intelectual
dc.subjectcognição
dc.subjectcorpo humano
dc.subjecthabilidades cognitivas
dc.titlePersonal Status in Intellectual Disability: Considering Cognitive Abilities
dc.titleEstatus personal en la discapacidad intelectual: considerando las capacidades cognitivas
dc.titleStatus pessoal na deficiência intelectual: considerando habilidades cognitivas
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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