A note on auctions with compulsory partnership

dc.creatorMonteiro, Paulo K.
dc.creatorAraujo, Aloisio
dc.creatorDamé, Otávio
dc.creatorCostellini, Clara
dc.date2016-12-28
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-31T21:38:06Z
dc.date.available2023-08-31T21:38:06Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/64559
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8560167
dc.descriptionWe study a symmetric, profitt share, common value auction witha twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to entera partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue atrate (say) 0 < r < 1. We show that it doesn't have an equilibrium inpure strategies.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEGV EPGEpt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/64559/63367
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2016 Revista Brasileira de Economiapt-BR
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; Vol. 70 No. 4 (2016): Out-Dez; 481-486en-US
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; v. 70 n. 4 (2016): Out-Dez; 481-486pt-BR
dc.source1806-9134
dc.source0034-7140
dc.subjectpre-salt auctionen-US
dc.subjectequilibrium existenceen-US
dc.titleA note on auctions with compulsory partnershipen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeArticlesen-US
dc.typeArtigospt-BR


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