dc.creatorGriebeler, Marcelo
dc.date2017-05-18
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-31T21:37:59Z
dc.date.available2023-08-31T21:37:59Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/60607
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8560154
dc.descriptionWe provide the microeconomic foundations of cheating in classroom through a static game with complete information. Our setting is composed by two students, who must choose whether or not to cheat, and a professor, who must choose how much effort to exert in trying to catch dishonest students. Our findings support the determinants of cheating found by the empirical literature, mainly those related to the penalty's level. It is also emphasized the importance of professors being well-motivated (with low disutility of effort) and worried about fairness in classroom. The two extensions of the baseline model reinforce the importance of the cost-benefit analysis to understand dishonest behavior in classroom.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEGV EPGEpt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/60607/67266
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2017 Revista Brasileira de Economiapt-BR
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; Vol. 71 No. 1 (2017): JAN-MAR; 43-65en-US
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; v. 71 n. 1 (2017): JAN-MAR; 43-65pt-BR
dc.source1806-9134
dc.source0034-7140
dc.subjectstudent cheatingen-US
dc.subjectgame theoryen-US
dc.subjectacademic dishonestyen-US
dc.titleCrime and punishment in classroom: a game-theoretic approach for student cheatingen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeArticlesen-US
dc.typeArtigospt-BR


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