Optimal Insider Strategy with Law Penalties

dc.creatorFajardo, Jose
dc.date2016-03-30
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-31T21:37:48Z
dc.date.available2023-08-31T21:37:48Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/48324
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8560131
dc.descriptionWe study the optimal continuous trading strategy of an insider whois subject to the possibility of law penalties due to her illegaltrading activity. Also, we discuss how to obtain the optimal penaltyrule in order to maximize a welfare function.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherEGV EPGEpt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/48324/58561
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2016 Revista Brasileira de Economiapt-BR
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; Vol. 70 No. 1 (2016): Jan-Mar; 31-40en-US
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; v. 70 n. 1 (2016): Jan-Mar; 31-40pt-BR
dc.source1806-9134
dc.source0034-7140
dc.subjectInsider tradingpt-BR
dc.subjectLaw Penaltiespt-BR
dc.titleOptimal Insider Strategy with Law Penaltiespt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeArticlesen-US
dc.typeArtigospt-BR


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