dc.creatorBertolai, Jefferson Donizeti Pereira
dc.creatorCavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira
dc.date2013-11-29
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-31T21:37:19Z
dc.date.available2023-08-31T21:37:19Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/11706
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8560081
dc.descriptionThe recent financial crisis creates a demand for welfare-based models of financial regulation and liquidity shortages. In this paper, we review policy implications from two cornerstone models and show that they imply different responses in terms of intertemporal returns of financial liabilities. In the first case, a version of the Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999), random-matching model, monitored agents are led to promote inflation in bank-issued money. In the second case, a sequential-service version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs with insolvency, increases in long-run returns can prevent bank runs by reducing the provision of liquidity.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherEGV EPGEpt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/11706/12450
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; Vol. 67 No. 4 (2013): Out-Dez; 383-401en-US
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; v. 67 n. 4 (2013): Out-Dez; 383-401pt-BR
dc.source1806-9134
dc.source0034-7140
dc.subjectinside moneypt-BR
dc.subjectinflationpt-BR
dc.subjectfinancial fragilitypt-BR
dc.subjectinsolvencypt-BR
dc.titleOpposite policy implications in the theory of money and bankingpt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeArticlesen-US
dc.typeArtigospt-BR


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