dc.creatorKalpokas, Daniel Enrique
dc.date2022-10
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-31T00:41:15Z
dc.date.available2023-08-31T00:41:15Z
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/202993
dc.identifierKalpokas, Daniel Enrique; A new case of the Myth of the Given?; John Wiley & Sons; Theoria. Swedish Journal of Philosophy; 88; 5; 10-2022; 927-942
dc.identifier1755-2567
dc.identifierCONICET Digital
dc.identifierCONICET
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8543680
dc.descriptionFor some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject's taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in a certain kind of relation with them, which makes them available to us, nevertheless, to be represented in judgement or belief. The question arises, however, whether this does not imply a new fall into the Myth of the Given. In this article, I argue for an affirmative response to that question.
dc.descriptionFil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/theo.12423
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/theo.12423
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subjectRELATIONAL VIEW
dc.subjectPERCEPTUAL CONTENT
dc.subjectSELLARS
dc.subjectEPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE
dc.subjecthttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
dc.subjecthttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.titleA new case of the Myth of the Given?
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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