| dc.creator | O, Ana L. de la | |
| dc.creator | González, Lucas Isaac | |
| dc.creator | Weitz Shapiro, Rebecca | |
| dc.date | 2023-05-30T09:51:37Z | |
| dc.date | 2023-05-30T09:51:37Z | |
| dc.date | 2022 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-30T15:40:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-08-30T15:40:17Z | |
| dc.identifier | O, A. L. de la, González, L. I., Weitz Shapiro, R. Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats [en línea]. World Development. 2023, 162. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.106131. Disponible en: https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/16417 | |
| dc.identifier | 0305-750X | |
| dc.identifier | https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/16417 | |
| dc.identifier | 10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.106131 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8526573 | |
| dc.description | Resumen: Can opportunities for undergoing voluntary oversight improve bureaucratic motivation and effort? Drawing
on insights fromthe social sciences, we argue that voluntary oversight increases front-line bureaucrats’ sense
of autonomy and competence, and may therefore increase their motivation and effort. Partnering with a
provincial auditing body in Argentina, we implement an encouragement design in which school principals
are invited to receive a voluntary audit of a publicly funded schoolmeal program.We employ a two-level randomization,
in which regions are first randomly assigned to a higher or lower rate of invitations, and then
schoolswithin regions are randomly assigned to treatment or control.We find divergent effects of treatment
based onthe density of treatment; inthe groupof regions assigned to the lower rate of invitations, school principals
assigned to treatment report increased motivation and a decrease in school closings. In contrast, in the
group of regions assigned to the higher rate of invitations, we observe the opposite effect. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork, we speculate that a higher rate of invitationsmay generate pressure to accept the invitation
and thereby undermine any positive effects of volunteering. Our results suggest the promise of voluntary
audits as well as the need for further research on the conditions under which voluntary oversight may have
differing consequences for bureaucratic effort and motivation | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | |
| dc.rights | Acceso abierto. 24 meses de embargo | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | |
| dc.source | World Development. 2023, 162 | |
| dc.subject | SUPERVISION | |
| dc.subject | AUDITORIA | |
| dc.subject | BUROCRACIA | |
| dc.subject | TRABAJO DE CAMPO | |
| dc.subject | ESCUELA PRIMARIA | |
| dc.title | Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats | |
| dc.type | Artículo | |
| dc.coverage | Argentina | |
