dc.creatorRoetti, Jorge Alfredo
dc.creatorRahman, Shahid
dc.date2023-08-11T18:57:08Z
dc.date2023-08-11T18:57:08Z
dc.date1999
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-30T13:31:29Z
dc.date.available2023-08-30T13:31:29Z
dc.identifierhttps://repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar/handle/123456789/6455
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8520877
dc.descriptionThe issue of this paper is to offer two (dialogical) ways of defending a non­ committal interpretation of paraconsistency: we will call one the permis sive interpretation and the other the non-ontological commitment interpretation. Stating contradictions and negations is from a permissive point of view of paraconsistency a purely formal matter: lf you do so, so can l. The non-ontological commitment approach results from two rules. One restricts the use and introduction of singular terms to its formal use. The other establishes how to combine the permissive interpretation with this restriction in a second order free logic.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.format17 pág.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidade de Santiago de Compostela
dc.rightsAtribución – No Comercial – Sin Obra Derivada (by-nc-nd): No se permite un uso comercial de la obra original ni la generación de obras derivadas. Esta licencia no es una licencia libre, y es la más cercana al derecho de autor tradicional.
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectLógica filosófica
dc.subjectLógica
dc.subjectInconsistencia
dc.titleDual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments


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