dc.contributorUniversidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
dc.creatorPolak, Ben
dc.date2013-09-25T18:12:08Z
dc.date2013-09-25T18:12:08Z
dc.date2013-09-25
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-05T18:57:30Z
dc.date.available2017-04-05T18:57:30Z
dc.identifierhttp://acervodigital.unesp.br/handle/unesp/70291
dc.identifierhttp://objetoseducacionais2.mec.gov.br/handle/mec/24226
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/847838
dc.descriptionPresents a class about the idea of evolutionary stability and the evolution of social conventions.Consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed. The discussion central in how such games can help to predict how behavior might vary across settings. Finally, consider a game in which there is no evolutionary stable population and discuss an example from nature
dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Ciências Exatas e da Terra::Ciência da Computação
dc.publisherYale University, Open Yale Courses
dc.relationEvolutionary stability_social convention.mp3
dc.rightsYale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply
dc.subjectEducação Superior::Ciências Exatas e da Terra::Ciência da Computação::Engenharia de Software
dc.subjectComputer science
dc.subjectGame
dc.titleEvolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles [Game theory]
dc.typeAudios


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