dc.contributor | Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) | |
dc.creator | Polak, Ben | |
dc.date | 2013-09-25T18:12:08Z | |
dc.date | 2013-09-25T18:12:08Z | |
dc.date | 2013-09-25 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-04-05T18:57:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-04-05T18:57:30Z | |
dc.identifier | http://acervodigital.unesp.br/handle/unesp/70291 | |
dc.identifier | http://objetoseducacionais2.mec.gov.br/handle/mec/24226 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/847838 | |
dc.description | Presents a class about the idea of evolutionary stability and the evolution of social conventions.Consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed. The discussion central in how such games can help to predict how behavior might vary across settings. Finally, consider a game in which there is no evolutionary stable population and discuss an example from nature | |
dc.description | Educação Superior::Ciências Exatas e da Terra::Ciência da Computação | |
dc.publisher | Yale University, Open Yale Courses | |
dc.relation | Evolutionary stability_social convention.mp3 | |
dc.rights | Yale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply | |
dc.subject | Educação Superior::Ciências Exatas e da Terra::Ciência da Computação::Engenharia de Software | |
dc.subject | Computer science | |
dc.subject | Game | |
dc.title | Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles [Game theory] | |
dc.type | Audios | |