dc.contributorBenoit, Jean Pierre. London Buisness School
dc.contributorDubra, Juan. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay
dc.creatorBenoit, Jean Pierre
dc.creatorDubra, Juan
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-04T19:50:36Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-24T17:17:40Z
dc.date.available2022-07-04T19:50:36Z
dc.date.available2023-08-24T17:17:40Z
dc.date.created2022-07-04T19:50:36Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1362
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8424874
dc.description.abstractNumerous experiments demonstrate attitude polarization. For instance, Lord, Ross & Lepper presented subjects with the same mixed evidence on the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Both believers and skeptics of its deterrent effect became more convinced of their views; that is, the population polarized. However, not all experiments find this attitude polarization. We propose a theory of rational updating that accounts for both the positive and negative experimental findings. This is in contrast to existing theories, which predict either too much or too little polarization.
dc.publisherUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía
dc.relationDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightsAbierto
dc.subjectAttitude polarization
dc.subjectConfirmation bias
dc.subjectBayesian decision making
dc.titleWhen do populations polarize? An explanation
dc.typeDocumentos de trabajo


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