dc.contributorUniversidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
dc.creatorPolak, Ben
dc.date2011-05-30T14:21:44Z
dc.date2011-05-30T14:21:44Z
dc.date2011-05-30
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-05T17:50:08Z
dc.date.available2017-04-05T17:50:08Z
dc.identifierhttp://acervodigital.unesp.br/handle/123456789/22495
dc.identifierhttp://objetoseducacionais2.mec.gov.br/handle/mec/13873
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/838428
dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção
dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia
dc.descriptionPresents part of course, Game theory , when Professor Polak shows how in business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentives for good behavior today, but, to work, these promises and threats must be credible. Presents the grim strategy forms such an equilibrium provided that we are patient and the game has a high probability of continuing. Discusses less draconian punishments, and find there is a trade off between the severity of punishments and the required probability that relationships will endure. Applies this idea to a moral-hazard problem that arises with outsourcing, and find that the high wage premiums found in foreign sectors of emerging markets may be reduced as these relationships become more stable
dc.publisherYale University, Open Yale Courses
dc.relationRepeated games 2.mp3
dc.rightsYale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply
dc.subjectEducação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção::Teoria dos Jogos
dc.subjectEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Economia Geral
dc.subjectIncentive
dc.subjectPunishment
dc.subjectStrategy
dc.subjectCompetitiveness
dc.titleRepeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing [Game theory]
dc.typeAudios


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