dc.contributorUniversidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
dc.creatorPolak, Ben
dc.date2011-05-30T14:21:43Z
dc.date2011-05-30T14:21:43Z
dc.date2011-05-30
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-05T17:50:05Z
dc.date.available2017-04-05T17:50:05Z
dc.identifierhttp://acervodigital.unesp.br/handle/123456789/22488
dc.identifierhttp://objetoseducacionais2.mec.gov.br/handle/mec/13884
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/838421
dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção
dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia
dc.descriptionPresents part of course, Game theory , when Professor Polak discusses repeated games, aiming to unpack the intuition that the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment in the future of a relationship can provide incentives for good behavior today. Shows the real-world problems of a lame duck leader and of maintaining incentives for those close to retirement. But it is possible to sustain good behavior in early stages of some repeated games (even if they are only played a few times) provided the stage games have two or more equilibria to be used as rewards and punishments. This may require us to play bad equilibria tomorrow. We relate this to the trade off between ex ante and ex post efficiency in the law. In the finish, we play a game in which the players do not know when the game will end, and we start to consider strategies for this potentially infinitely repeated game
dc.publisherYale University, Open Yale Courses
dc.relationRepeated games.mp3
dc.rightsYale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply
dc.subjectEducação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção::Teoria dos Jogos
dc.subjectEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Economia Geral
dc.subjectIncentive
dc.subjectPunishment
dc.subjectCooperation
dc.titleRepeated games: cooperation vs. the end game [Game theory]
dc.typeAudios


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