dc.contributorUniversidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
dc.creatorPolak, Ben
dc.date2011-05-30T14:20:36Z
dc.date2011-05-30T14:20:36Z
dc.date2011-05-30
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-05T17:49:04Z
dc.date.available2017-04-05T17:49:04Z
dc.identifierhttp://acervodigital.unesp.br/handle/123456789/22357
dc.identifierhttp://objetoseducacionais2.mec.gov.br/handle/mec/13862
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/838290
dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia
dc.descriptionPresents a class that analyzes some games using a new solution concept created by the Professor and students, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves players' trusting that others will not make mistakes. It has three Nash equilibria but only one is consistent with backward induction. The other two Nash equilibria are not subgame perfect: each fails to induce Nash in a subgame. The second game involves a matchmaker sending a couple on a date. There are three Nash equilibria in the dating subgame. The Professor construct three corresponding subgame perfect equilibria of the whole game by rolling back each of the equilibrium payoffs from the subgame. Finally, the Professor analyze a game in which a firm has to decide whether to invest in a machine that will reduce its costs of production
dc.publisherYale University, Open Yale Courses
dc.relationSubgame perfect.mp3
dc.rightsYale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply
dc.subjectEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Teoria Monetária e Financeira
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleSubgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments [Game theory]
dc.typeAudios


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