dc.creatorPhilippe Faucher
dc.creatorElliott Armijo Leslie
dc.date2004
dc.date2022-03-17T17:58:16Z
dc.date2022-03-17T17:58:16Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-23T16:24:46Z
dc.date.available2023-08-23T16:24:46Z
dc.identifierhttp://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21847204
dc.identifierhttp://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/49405
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8372474
dc.descriptionThis paper seeks to explain why exchange rate crises of rather similar causes and magnitude can be so much harder for one emerging market country to absorb and bounce back from than for another. Our argument takes three recent currency crises as examples: Argentina (late 2001) and Brazil (early 1999 and mid-2002). We conclude that most of the difference resulted from the structure of domestic political institutions and the incentives for cooperation and conflict that such institutions created for political incumbents and other players.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageen
dc.publisherUniversidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
dc.relationhttp://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=218
dc.rightsDados - Revista de Ciências Sociais
dc.sourceDados - Revista de Ciências Sociais (Brasil) Num.2 Vol.47
dc.subjectSociología
dc.subjectArgentina Brazil currency exchange crises
dc.titleCrises cambiais e estrutura decisória: a política de recuperação econômica na argentina e no Brasil
dc.typeartículo científico


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