dc.creatorLOBEIRAS, María Jesús Vázquez
dc.date2017-07-14
dc.date2022-03-21T17:55:40Z
dc.date2022-03-21T17:55:40Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-23T15:57:24Z
dc.date.available2023-08-23T15:57:24Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/7085
dc.identifier10.36311/2318-0501.2017.v5n1.13.p179
dc.identifierhttp://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/72672
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8364321
dc.descriptionImmanuel Kant’s name is frequently invoked in discussions on bioethics and biolaw in relation to fundamental concepts such as human dignity or autonomy. In this paper we present a reconstruction of the use of the concept of autonomy in both spheres of bioethics and biolaw, as well as in Kant’s thinking. There are very significant distortions in the use and application of concepts of a Kantian order in the context of these debates, ex., the distinction made by Diego Gracia between pure freedom and empirical freedom. Concepts such as “autonomous act”, “freedom” and “free will” are clarified and the limited scope of Kant’s notion of autonomy, of a clearly ontological nature, is examined for its application in the field of biolaw.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherFaculdade de Filosofia e Ciências
dc.relationhttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/7085/4552
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2017 Estudos Kantianos [EK]
dc.sourceKantian Studies (EK); Vol. 5 No. 01 (2017)
dc.sourceEstudos Kantianos [EK]; v. 5 n. 01 (2017)
dc.source2318-0501
dc.titleKANT COMO INTERLOCUTOR EN EL ÁMBITO DE LA BIOÉTICA Y LA BIOJURÍDICA: EL PROBLEMA DE LA AUTONOMÍA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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