dc.contributorDr. Claudio López-Guerra
dc.creatorOlmos Camarillo, Jorge
dc.date2018-10-02T14:10:45Z
dc.date2018-10-02T14:10:45Z
dc.date2018
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-21T16:37:59Z
dc.date.available2023-07-21T16:37:59Z
dc.identifier161401.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11651/2523
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/7732537
dc.descriptionDemocracy by lot has been gaining support among political scientists as an alternative to replace electoral democracy due to its normative advantages. However, I argue that electoral democracy based on proportional representation can produce better or equal results than those based on political sortition regarding responsiveness and efficiency in policymaking while not increasing the probability of legislative capture. I build a formal model that describes the incentives faced by legislators selected by lotteries and elections and conclude that electoral rules can produce better legislative outcomes because of the dangers of biased sampling. Majority rules can achieve efficient policymaking through accountability in homogenous societies and proportional rules via representativeness in heterogenous communities.
dc.formatapplication/PDF
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEl Autor
dc.rightsCon fundamento en los artículos 21 y 27 de la Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor y como titular de los derechos moral y patrimonial, otorgo de manera gratuita y permanente al Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. y a su Biblioteca autorización para que fije la obra en cualquier medio, incluido el electrónico, y la divulguen entre sus usuarios, profesores, estudiantes o terceras personas, sin que pueda percibir por tal divulgación una contraprestación.
dc.rightsCreative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional CC BY-NC-ND
dc.subjectPolicy sciences -- Decision making -- Mathematical models.
dc.subjectProportional representation.
dc.titleElections and lotteries: responsiveness, capture and efficient policymaking
dc.typeTesis de maestría
dc.proquest.rightsNo


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