dc.contributorDr. Alexander Elbittar
dc.creatorTrujano Ochoa, Darío
dc.date2017-09-19T14:55:18Z
dc.date2017-09-19T14:55:18Z
dc.date2017
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-21T16:36:23Z
dc.date.available2023-07-21T16:36:23Z
dc.identifier156448.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11651/1719
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/7731688
dc.descriptionIn this thesis I address the next question: can the QRE theory, with more realistic assumptions, explain better the behavior than Nash Equilibrium (NE) in an experiment based in Citizen-Candidate model? The contribution of this thesis is to answer this question with the analysis of data from the election experiment assuming that agents are not rational, but they are strategic. In this sense, this work is located at the intersection of two perspectives: first, Behavioral Game Theory (Camerer, 2003; Gächter, 2004), where QRE can be considered; and second, Political Economy (Besley, 2007), where the citizen-candidate model is an important instance. I conclude that, considering stochastic and non-perfect maximizing decision rule, it is possible to better describe candidates’ decisions in the experiment.
dc.formatapplication/PDF
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEl Autor
dc.rightsCon fundamento en los artículos 21 y 27 de la Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor y como titular de los derechos moral y patrimonial, otorgo de manera gratuita y permanente al Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. y a su Biblioteca autorización para que fije la obra en cualquier medio, incluido el electrónico, y la divulguen entre sus usuarios, profesores, estudiantes o terceras personas, sin que pueda percibir por tal divulgación una contraprestación.
dc.rightsCreative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional CC BY-NC-ND
dc.subjectPolitical candidates -- Elections -- Decision making -- Mathematical models.
dc.titleQuantal response equilibrium in a citizen-candidate experiment
dc.typeTesis de maestría
dc.proquest.rightsNo


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