| dc.creator | FRANCISCO SANCHEZ SANCHEZ | |
| dc.date | 2008 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-21T15:46:40Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-07-21T15:46:40Z | |
| dc.identifier | http://cimat.repositorioinstitucional.mx/jspui/handle/1008/954 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/7729494 | |
| dc.description | We consider matching markets at a senior level, where workers are assigned
to firms at an unstable matching—the status-quo—which might not be Pareto
efficient. It might also be that none of the matchings Pareto superior to the status-quo
are Core stable.We propose two weakenings of Core stability: status-quo stability and
weakened stability, and the respective mechanisms which lead any status-quo to matchings
meeting the stability requirements above mentioned. The first one is inspired
by the Top trading cycle and Deferred Acceptance procedures, the other one belongs
to the family of Branch and Bound algorithms. The last procedure finds a core stable
matching in many-to-one markets whenever it exists, dispensing with the assumption
of substitutability. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Springer Verlag | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/MSC/Matemáticas Financieras | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/1 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/12 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/1299 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/129999 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/129999 | |
| dc.title | Welfare and stability in senior matching markets | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
| dc.audience | researchers | |
