| dc.creator | LUIS HERNANDEZ LAMONEDA | |
| dc.date | 2008 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-21T15:46:39Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-07-21T15:46:39Z | |
| dc.identifier | http://cimat.repositorioinstitucional.mx/jspui/handle/1008/943 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/7729483 | |
| dc.description | In this paper we study an expression for all additive, symmetric and efficient solutions, i.e.,
the set of axioms that traditionally are used to characterize the Shapley value except for the
dummy axiom. Also, we obtain an expression for this kind of solutions by including the self
duality axiom. These expressions allow us to give an alternative formula for the consensus
value, the generalized consensus value and the solidarity solution. Furthermore, we introduce
a new axiom called coalitional independence which replaces the symmetry axiom and use it
to get similar results. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/MSC/Teoría de Juegos | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/1 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/12 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/1299 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/129999 | |
| dc.subject | info:eu-repo/classification/cti/129999 | |
| dc.title | Solutions without dummy axiom for TU cooperative games | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
| dc.audience | researchers | |
