| dc.creator | Chichi, Graciela Marta | |
| dc.date | 2002 | |
| dc.date | 2022-03-03T13:24:20Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-15T05:09:48Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-07-15T05:09:48Z | |
| dc.identifier | http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/131852 | |
| dc.identifier | issn:0920-427X | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/7472321 | |
| dc.description | In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the <i>ad hominem</i>-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the <i>ad hominem</i>, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or <i>tu quoque</i> types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4). | |
| dc.description | Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.format | 333-348 | |
| dc.language | en | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) | |
| dc.subject | Filosofía | |
| dc.subject | argumentum ad hominem | |
| dc.subject | argumentum ad personam | |
| dc.subject | Aristotle | |
| dc.subject | dialectics | |
| dc.subject | Schopenhauer | |
| dc.title | The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument | |
| dc.type | Articulo | |
| dc.type | Articulo | |
