dc.creatorColeff, Joaquín
dc.date2013-12
dc.date2021-10-27T13:30:53Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-15T03:51:46Z
dc.date.available2023-07-15T03:51:46Z
dc.identifierhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/127347
dc.identifierhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jems.12335
dc.identifierissn:1058-6407
dc.identifierissn:1530-9134
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/7467339
dc.descriptionWe analyze a monopolist’s pricing and product reliability problem when consumers are entitled to product replacement but have heterogeneous cost of exercising this right, and we assess the implications of a decrease in consumers’ claiming cost on reliability, profit, and welfare. We find that reducing consumers’ claiming cost may reduce reliability and increase profit. Additionally, the model can explain why some firms encourage consumers to complain while others discourage consumers from complaining. We also show that welfare and profit are partially aligned, specially when consumers’ claiming cost are relatively low and the firm prefers to promote complaints; consequently, we find that encouraging complaints will eventually increase welfare.
dc.descriptionFacultad de Ciencias Económicas
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageen
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
dc.subjectCiencias Económicas
dc.subjectEconomía
dc.subjectproduct reliability
dc.subjectconsumer complaints
dc.subjectliability cost
dc.subjectwarranty
dc.titleCan consumer complaints reduce product reliability? Should we worry?
dc.typeArticulo
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución