dc.creatorGonzález, P.
dc.creatorRebón, Lorena
dc.creatorFerreira da Silva, T.
dc.creatorFigueroa, Miguel
dc.creatorSaavedra, Carlos
dc.creatorCurty, Marcos
dc.creatorLima, G.
dc.creatorXavier, Guilherme B.
dc.creatorNogueira, W. A. T.
dc.date2015-08-18
dc.date2021-09-29T17:12:40Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-15T03:36:05Z
dc.date.available2023-07-15T03:36:05Z
dc.identifierhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/125859
dc.identifierissn:1050-2947
dc.identifierissn:1094-1622
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/7466331
dc.descriptionSide-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.
dc.descriptionInstituto de Física La Plata
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageen
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
dc.subjectFísica
dc.subjectPhysics
dc.subjectQuantum cryptography
dc.subjectImplementation
dc.subjectEavesdropping
dc.subjectComputer security
dc.subjectQuantum information science
dc.subjectDetector
dc.subjectQuantum key distribution
dc.subjectRobustness (computer science)
dc.titleQuantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
dc.typeArticulo
dc.typeArticulo


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución