Investment without regulatory commitment: The case of elastic demand

dc.creatorUrbiztondo, Santiago
dc.date1994
dc.date2021-08-25T12:49:49Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-15T02:43:36Z
dc.date.available2023-07-15T02:43:36Z
dc.identifierhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/123345
dc.identifierissn:0922-680X
dc.identifierissn:1573-0468
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/7463043
dc.descriptionThis paper analyzes a regulation game with asymmetric information and lack of commitment. It expands Besanko and Spulber's (1989) framework to the case of elastic demands using a generalized Nash solution. It is found that the most important property of the equilibrium with inelastic demand is not carried over to the elastic demand case, i.e., incomplete information worsens underinvestment, contrasting to Besanko and Spulber's result.
dc.descriptionFacultad de Ciencias Económicas
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.format87-96
dc.languageen
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
dc.subjectCiencias Económicas
dc.subjectComplete information
dc.subjectInformation asymmetry
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectMicroeconomics
dc.subjectPublic finance
dc.subjectInvestment (macroeconomics)
dc.subjectNash solution
dc.subjectPrice elasticity of demand
dc.titleInvestment without regulatory commitment: The case of elastic demand
dc.typeArticulo
dc.typeArticulo


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución