dc.creatorCruces, Guillermo Antonio
dc.creatorRossi, Martín
dc.creatorSchargrodsky, Ernesto
dc.date2020-11
dc.date2020
dc.date2021-07-14T18:32:46Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-15T02:27:20Z
dc.date.available2023-07-15T02:27:20Z
dc.identifierhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/121702
dc.identifierhttps://aaep.org.ar/anales/works/works2020/Rossi.pdf
dc.identifierissn:1852-0022
dc.identifierisbn:978-987-28590-8-4
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/7462012
dc.descriptionWe study the link between dishonesty and selection into public employment. When military conscription was mandatory in Argentina, eligibility was determined by a lottery and by a medical examination. In order to avoid conscription, drafted individuals had strong incentives to cheat in their medical examination. These incentives varied with the lottery number. Exploiting this exogenous variation in the propensity to engage in dishonest behavior during early adulthood (the “impressionable” years), we find that individuals with higher probability of having cheated in their health checks as young adults also show higher propensity to become public employees later in life.
dc.descriptionFacultad de Ciencias Económicas
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageen
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
dc.subjectCiencias Económicas
dc.subjectMilitary service
dc.subjectConscription
dc.subjectPublic sector
dc.subjectState capacities
dc.subjectCheating
dc.titleDishonesty and Public Employment
dc.typeObjeto de conferencia
dc.typeObjeto de conferencia


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