Independencia de la junta directiva y desempeño financiero: evidencia de empresas colombianas

dc.creatorLagos-Cortés, Diógenes
dc.creatorRoncancio-Rachid, Rolando
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-23T16:15:58Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-05T15:57:56Z
dc.date.available2021-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date.available2023-01-23T16:15:58Z
dc.date.available2023-06-05T15:57:56Z
dc.date.created2021-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date.created2023-01-23T16:15:58Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-01
dc.identifier10.14718/revfinanzpolitecon.v13.n1.2021.8
dc.identifier2011-7663
dc.identifier2248-6046
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10983/29438
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.14718/revfinanzpolitecon.v13.n1.2021.8
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/6646696
dc.description.abstractEl objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la relación entre la independencia de la junta directiva y el desempeño financiero (variables ROA, ROE y Q de Tobin). Se usaron dos perspectivas de independencia: por un lado, la Ley 964 de 2005, obligatoria en el mercado de valores colombiano; por otro, una perspectiva ampliada que incluyó relaciones de negocios (directorios cruzados, antigüedad), relaciones financieras (paquetes de compensación, participación en la propiedad) y relaciones personales (fundadores, miembros de la familia propietaria) como factores que limitan la independencia. Se usaron modelos de regresión (efectos aleatorios) en un panel de datos no balanceado compuesto por 69 empresas de la Bolsa de Valores de Colombia. Los resultados mostraron que una definición de independencia más rigurosa es apreciada mejor por el mercado. En específico, se encontró que la independencia de la junta directiva no afecta el desempeño contable (ROA y ROE), pero sí el desempeño en el mercado (Q de Tobin).  
dc.description.abstractThis work aims to analyze the relationship between management board independence and financial performance (variables ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q). Two perspectives on independence were used: (a) Law 964 of 2005 (mandatory in the Colombian stock market) and (b) an expanded view that included business relationships (cross-directorships, seniority on the board), financial relationships (compensation packages, ownership participation), and personal relationships (founders, members of the owner family) as factors that limit independence. Regression models (random effects) were used on an unbalanced data panel composed of 69 companies from the Colombian Stock Exchange. The results showed that a more rigorous definition of independence is better appreciated by the market. It was found that board independence does not affect accounting performance (ROA and ROE), but it does affect market performance (Tobin’s Q).
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Católica de Colombia
dc.relationhttps://revfinypolecon.ucatolica.edu.co/article/download/3387/3877
dc.relationhttps://revfinypolecon.ucatolica.edu.co/article/download/3387/3672
dc.relationhttps://revfinypolecon.ucatolica.edu.co/article/download/3387/3808
dc.relationNúm. 1 , Año 2021
dc.relation196
dc.relation1
dc.relation171
dc.relation13
dc.relationRevista Finanzas y Política Económica
dc.relationAguilera, R. V. (2005). Corporate governance and director accountability: An institutional comparative perspective. British Journal of Management, 16, S39-S53. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00446.x
dc.relationAnderson, R. C. y Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2), 209-237. https://doi.org/10.2307/4131472
dc.relationArosa, B., Iturralde, T. y Maseda, A. (2013). The board structure and firm performance in SMEs: Evidence from Spain. Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa, 19(3), 127-135. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iedee.2012.12.003
dc.relationBaysinger, B. y Butler, H. (1985). Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1(1), 101-124. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036883
dc.relationBhagat, S. y Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporate Law, 27, 231-273. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.133808
dc.relationBrennan, N. (2006). Boards of directors and firm performance: is there an expectations gap? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(6), 577-593. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2006.00534.x
dc.relationBrennan, N. y McDermott, M. (2004). Alternative perspectives on independence of directors. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 325-336. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00373.x
dc.relationBrown, P., Beekes, W. y Verhoeven, P. (2011). Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review. Accounting & Finance, 51(1), 96-172. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2010.00385.x
dc.relationCai, J., Liu, Y., Qian, Y. y Yu, M. (2015). Information asymmetry and corporate governance. Quarterly Journal of Finance, 5(3), 1550014.
dc.relationCavaco, S., Challe, E., Crifo, P., Rebérioux, A. y Roudaut, G. (2016). Board independence and operating performance: analysis on (French) company and individual data. Applied Economics, 48(52), 5093-5105. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2016.1170936
dc.relationCavaco, S., Crifo, P., Rebérioux, A. y Roudaut, G. (2017). Independent directors: Less informed but better selected than affiliated board members? Journal of Corporate Finance, 43, 106-121. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.004
dc.relationClaessens, S., Djankov, S. y Lang, L. H. P. (2000). Separation of Ownership from Control of East Asian Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81-112. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00067-2
dc.relationCongreso de la República de Colombia. (2005). Ley 964 de 2005, “por la cual se dictan normas generales y se señalan en ellas los objetivos y criterios a los cuales debe sujetarse el Gobierno Nacional para regular las actividades de manejo, aprovechamiento e inversión de recursos captados del público”. Diario Oficial 45.963.
dc.relationDalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E. y Johnson, J. L. (1998). Board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance: Meta-analytic reviews and research agenda. Strategic Management Journal, 19(3), 269-290. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199803)19:3<269::AID-SMJ950>3.0.CO;2-K
dc.relationde Andres, P. y Vallelado, E. (2008). Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(12), 2570-2580. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.008
dc.relationDulewicz, V. y Herbert, P. (2004). Does the composition and practice of boards of directors bear any relationship to the performance of their companies? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 263-280. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00368.x
dc.relationDunn, P. (2004). The impact of insider power on fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Management, 30(3), 397-412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jm.2003.02.004
dc.relationElloumi, F. y Gueyie, J.-P. (2001). Financial distress and corporate governance: an empirical analysis. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 1(1), 15-23. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700110389548
dc.relationFama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307. https://doi.org/10.1086/260866
dc.relationFama, E. F. y Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 301-325. https://doi.org/10.1086/467037
dc.relationFinkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. y Cannella, A. A. (1996). Strategic leadership. St. Paul: West Educational Publishing.
dc.relationGabrielsson, J. y Huse, M. (2005). Outside directors in SME boards: A call for theoretical reflections. Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition, 1(1), 28-37. https://doi.org/10.22495/cbv1i1art3
dc.relationGangi, F., Daniele, L. M. y Varrone, N. (2020). How do corporate environmental policy and corporate reputation affect risk‐adjusted financial performance? Business Strategy and the Environment, 29(5), 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2482
dc.relationGarcía-Sánchez, I.-M. (2010). The effectiveness of corporate governance: Board structure and business technical efficiency in Spain. Central European Journal of Operations Research, 18(3), 311–339. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-009-0112-4
dc.relationGonzález, M., Guzmán, A., Pombo, C. y Trujillo, M.-A. (2013). Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control. Journal of Business Research, 66(11), 2308-2320. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2012.03.014
dc.relationHaldar, A., Shah, R., Nageswara Rao, S. V. D., Stokes, P., Demirbas, D. y Dardour, A. (2018). Corporate performance: Does board independence matter?–Indian evidence. International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 26(1), 185-200. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOA-12-2017-1296
dc.relationHausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 46(6), 1251-1271.
dc.relationHermalin, B. E. y Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 7-26.
dc.relationHillman, A. J. y Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 383-396. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2003.10196729
dc.relationHinna, A. y Monteduro, F. (2017). Boards, governance and value creation in grant-giving foundations. Journal of Management & Governance, 21(4), 935-961. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-016-9370-4
dc.relationHossain, M., Prevost, A. K. y Rao, R. P. (2001). Corporate governance in New Zealand: The effect of the 1993 Companies Act on the relation between board composition and firm performance. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 9(2), 119-145. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-538X(01)00003-8
dc.relationJara-Bertin, M. y López-Iturriaga, F. J. (2014). Earnings management and the contest to the control: an international analysis of family-owned firms. Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting, 43(4), 355-379. https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2014.965922
dc.relationJensen, M. C. y Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
dc.relationJermias, J. y Gani, L. (2014). The impact of board capital and board characteristics on firm performance. The British Accounting Review, 46(2), 135-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2013.12.001
dc.relationKlein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375-400. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00059-9
dc.relationKrivogorsky, V. (2006). Ownership, board structure, and performance in continental Europe. The International Journal of Accounting, 41(2), 176-197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2006.04.002
dc.relationLa Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. y Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. https://doi.org/10.1086/250042
dc.relationLabra, R. y Torrecillas, C. (2014). Guía CERO para datos de panel. Un enfoque práctico. UAM-Accenture Working Papers, 16(1), 57.
dc.relationLeung, S., Richardson, G. y Jaggi, B. (2014). Corporate board and board committee independence, firm performance, and family ownership concentration: An analysis based on Hong Kong firms. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 10(1), 16-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2013.11.002
dc.relationLiang, Q., Xu, P. y Jiraporn, P. (2013). Board characteristics and Chinese bank performance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 2953-2968. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.018
dc.relationLiu, Y., Miletkov, M. K., Wei, Z. y Yang, T. (2015). Board independence and firm performance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 223-244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.12.004
dc.relationMcNulty, T. y Pettigrew, A. (1996). The Contribution, Power and Influence of Part-time Board Members. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 4(3), 160-179. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.1996.tb00145.x
dc.relationMin, B. S. y Smyth, R. (2014). Corporate governance, globalization and firm productivity. Journal of World Business, 49(3), 372-385. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2013.07.004
dc.relationMoreno, G. J. I., Lagos, D. y Gómez, B. G. (2017). Effect of the Board of Directors on Firm Performance. International Journal of Economic Research, 14(6), 349-361.
dc.relationMulgrew, M., Lynn, T. y Rice, S. (2014). Is director independence merely a box ticking exercise? A study of independence determinations in Irish listed companies. Corporate Governance, 14(2), 141-161. https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-03-2012-0015
dc.relationMüller, V.-O. (2014). The impact of board composition on the financial performance of FTSE100 constituents. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 109, 969-975. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.12.573
dc.relationMuniandy, B. y Hillier, J. (2015). Board independence, investment opportunity set and performance of South African firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 35, 108-124. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2014.11.003
dc.relationNicholson, G. J. y Kiel, G. C. (2007). Can Directors Impact Performance? A case based test of three theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 585-608.
dc.relationPathan, S. y Faff, R. (2013). Does board structure in banks really affect their performance? Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(5), 1573-1589. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.12.016
dc.relationPfeffer, J. y Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. Nueva York: Harper & Row.
dc.relationRashid, A. (2018). Board independence and firm performance: Evidence from Bangladesh. Future Business Journal, 4(1), 34-49.
dc.relationRebeiz, K. S. (2018). Relationship between boardroom independence and corporate performance: Reflections and perspectives. European Management Journal, 36(1), 83-90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2017.01.008
dc.relationReverte, C. (2009). Do better governed firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital?: Evidence from Spanish firms. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 9(2), 133-145. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700910946587
dc.relationRosenstein, S. y Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(2), 175-191. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(90)90002-H
dc.relationWeir, C. y Laing, D. (2001). Governance structures, director independence and corporate performance in the UK. European Business Review, 13(2), 86-95. https://doi.org/10.1108/09555340110385254
dc.relationWintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S. y Netter, J. M. (2012). Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), 581-606. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.03.005
dc.relationWooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Londres: MIT press.
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.rightsDiógenes Lagos Cortés - 2021
dc.sourcehttps://revfinypolecon.ucatolica.edu.co/article/view/3387
dc.subjectEconomic performane
dc.subjectCorporate government
dc.subjectBoard independence
dc.subjectMangement board
dc.subjectDesempeño económico
dc.subjectGobierno corporativo
dc.subjectIndependencia de la junta
dc.subjectJunta directiva
dc.titleIndependencia de la junta directiva y desempeño financiero: evidencia de empresas colombianas
dc.typeArtículo de revista


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución