dc.creator | Herrera-Saavedra, Juan Pablo | |
dc.creator | Sánchez-Navarro, Dennis | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-01-01 00:00:00 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-01-23T16:14:32Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-06-05T15:53:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-01-01 00:00:00 | |
dc.date.available | 2023-01-23T16:14:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-06-05T15:53:28Z | |
dc.date.created | 2016-01-01 00:00:00 | |
dc.date.created | 2023-01-23T16:14:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-01-01 | |
dc.identifier | 10.14718/revfinanzpolitecon.2016.8.1.8 | |
dc.identifier | 2011-7663 | |
dc.identifier | 2248-6046 | |
dc.identifier | https://hdl.handle.net/10983/29349 | |
dc.identifier | https://doi.org/10.14718/revfinanzpolitecon.2016.8.1.8 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/6646536 | |
dc.description.abstract | Este artículo modela los posibles efectos que, ante una integración empresarial, se pueden producir sobre el precio de un mercado de un bien homogéneo. El análisis se realiza a partir de dos escenarios: a) considerando tecnologías similares entre firmas y b) asumiendo algún grado de heterogeneidad por grupos de empresas. Se encuentra que aun en presencia de operaciones en favor de la eficiencia en la oferta del producto, existen riesgos de incremento en precios. | |
dc.description.abstract | This article models the potential effects of firm mergers on the price of a market for homogenous goods. The analysis is carried out according to two scenarios: a) firms have similar levels of technology at their disposal and b) a degree of heterogeneity is assumed between groups of firms. It is found that even when mechanisms are in place to favor efficiency in product supply, there is a risk that prices will increase. | |
dc.language | spa | |
dc.publisher | Universidad Católica de Colombia | |
dc.relation | https://revfinypolecon.ucatolica.edu.co/article/download/932/979 | |
dc.relation | https://revfinypolecon.ucatolica.edu.co/article/download/932/2152 | |
dc.relation | https://revfinypolecon.ucatolica.edu.co/article/download/932/2263 | |
dc.relation | Núm. 1 , Año 2016 | |
dc.relation | 164 | |
dc.relation | 1 | |
dc.relation | 157 | |
dc.relation | 8 | |
dc.relation | Revista Finanzas y Política Económica | |
dc.relation | Beckman S., DeAngelo G. y Smith, J. (2012). Expermients on horizontal mergers: does size matter? Econmics Letters, 117(3). Recuperado de https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v117y2012i3p537-539.html | |
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dc.relation | Cournot A. (1838). Researches into the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth. Londres: MacMillan. | |
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dc.relation | Epstein, R. y Rubinfeld, D. (2001). Merger simulation: a simplified approach with new applications. Antitrust Journal, 69, 883-919. | |
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dc.relation | Pyndick, R. y Runbinfeld, D. (2013). Microeconomics (8.a ed.). Nueva York: Pearson. | |
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dc.relation | Shy, O. (1996). Industrial organization: theory and applications. Cambridge: The MIT Press. | |
dc.relation | Tsitsiklis, J. y Xu Y. (2014). Efficiency loss in a cournot oligopoly with convex market demand. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 53. Recuperado de http://www.mit.edu/~yunjian/Cournot.pdf | |
dc.relation | Varian, H. (1992). Microeconomic analysis (3.a ed.). Nueva York: W. W. Norton Company. | |
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dc.relation | Werden, G. (1997). Simulating the effects of differentiated products mergers: A practical alternative to structural merger policy. George Mason Law Review, 5, 363-386. | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.rights | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |
dc.rights | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | |
dc.rights | Juan Pablo Herrera Saavedra, Dennis Sánchez Navarro - 2016 | |
dc.source | https://revfinypolecon.ucatolica.edu.co/article/view/932 | |
dc.subject | Oligopoly | |
dc.subject | Cournot | |
dc.subject | Homogenous goods | |
dc.subject | Firm behavior | |
dc.subject | Production | |
dc.subject | Non-cooperative games. | |
dc.subject | Cournot | |
dc.subject | Bienes homogéneos | |
dc.subject | Comportamiento de las firmas | |
dc.subject | Producción | |
dc.subject | Juegos no cooperativos | |
dc.subject | Oligopolio | |
dc.subject | Cournot | |
dc.subject | Bens homogêneos | |
dc.subject | Comportamentos das empresas | |
dc.subject | Produção | |
dc.subject | Jogos não cooperativos. | |
dc.subject | Oligopólio | |
dc.title | Efectos de integraciones de firmas en mercados de bienes homogéneos. | |
dc.type | Artículo de revista | |