[en] MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE BRAZILIAN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET: EVIDENCES BASED ON THE PNAD 98

[pt] RISCO MORAL E SELEÇÃO ADVERSA NO MERCADO DE SEGUROS DE SAÚDE NO BRASIL: EVIDÊNCIAS BASEADAS NA PNAD 98

dc.creatorKELLY DE ALMEIDA SIMOES
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-21T21:42:05Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-13T20:44:01Z
dc.date.available2022-09-21T21:42:05Z
dc.date.available2023-03-13T20:44:01Z
dc.date.created2022-09-21T21:42:05Z
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12032/42360
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/6174339
dc.publisherMAXWELL
dc.subject[pt] MERCADO DE PLANOS DE SAUDE
dc.subject[pt] RISCO MORAL
dc.subject[pt] SELECAO ADVERSA
dc.subject[en] HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET
dc.subject[en] MORAL HAZARD
dc.subject[en] ADVERSE SELECTION
dc.title[en] MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE BRAZILIAN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET: EVIDENCES BASED ON THE PNAD 98
dc.title[pt] RISCO MORAL E SELEÇÃO ADVERSA NO MERCADO DE SEGUROS DE SAÚDE NO BRASIL: EVIDÊNCIAS BASEADAS NA PNAD 98
dc.typeTEXTO


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