dc.creatorWang, Chenyu
dc.date2020-08-11
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-08T19:00:11Z
dc.date.available2023-03-08T19:00:11Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/economia/article/view/22531
dc.identifier10.18800/economia.202002.001
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5961756
dc.descriptionThis project lies at the frontier between environmental economics and industrial organization. We use a duopoly setting of a three-stage game; in the first stage, the government chooses an emission tax and aims for maximizing welfare; in the second stage, firms use R&D to reduce their emissions; in the last stage, firms compete a la Cournot with differentiated products. We focus on two policy regimes and three scenarios, namely regimes of competition and merger andscenarios of commitment, non-commitment, and exogenous tax. The study focuses on two major questions: (1) what is the effect of merger on R&D, and the effect of commitment on R&D? (2) what is the effect of merger and commitment on the economy? Results are obtained through numerical simulations of the model. We find that: (i) Merger has a positive effect on R&D under non-commitment and the exogenous tax scenarios. (ii) Under commitment, if goods are imperfect substitutes or homogenous, merger has a negative effect on R&D; if goods are complements or independent, merger has a positive effect on R&D. (iii) For any types of goods under any regime, commitment has a negative effect on R&D.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherPontificia Universidad Católica del Perúen-US
dc.relationhttps://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/economia/article/view/22531/21721
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceEconomía; Volume 43 Issue 86 (2020); 1-38es-ES
dc.source2304-4306
dc.source0254-4415
dc.subjectEnvironmental Economicsen-US
dc.subjectIndustrial Organizationen-US
dc.subjectEnvironmental R&Den-US
dc.subjectEnvironmental Modellingen-US
dc.titleEnvironmental Policy, Mergers and Environmental R&D with Spilloversen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución