The pragmatic value of pragmatic values

dc.creatorWilburn, Ron
dc.date2021-11-01
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-04T15:26:57Z
dc.date.available2022-11-04T15:26:57Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.upr.edu/index.php/dialogos/article/view/19378
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5122218
dc.descriptionIn this paper I argue that Rorty's pragmatism fails to be a freestanding doctrine. Rorty's pragmatism is only tenable, I maintain, if it is offered against the background presumption of a substantive and unqualified realism. Our theories must be responsible to the world, in effect, in a manner typically affirmed by correspondence theories of truth. Hence, I argue against the adequacy of Rorty's pragmatism by arguing for the necessity of correspondence truth (heretofore, "CT"). And, more specifically, I argue against the adequacy of Rorty's pragmatism by arguing that the presumption of CT is a precondition for our possessing a coherent understanding of our own epistemic practices. By "epistemic practices" I here mean those practices through which we engage in epistemic valuation, judging some epistemic audiences to be "better-informed", "more reliable", or otherwise epistemically superior to others.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedrases-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.upr.edu/index.php/dialogos/article/view/19378/16867
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceDiálogos; No. 84 (2004); 179-191en-US
dc.sourceDiálogos; Núm. 84 (2004); 179-191es-ES
dc.source2693-9339
dc.source0012-2122
dc.subjectPragmaticen-US
dc.subjectvalueen-US
dc.subjectPragmáticoes-ES
dc.subjectValores-ES
dc.titleThe pragmatic value of pragmatic valuesen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typetexten-US


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución