dc.creatorMonroy-Nasr, Zunaya
dc.date2001-01-07
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-04T15:26:53Z
dc.date.available2022-11-04T15:26:53Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.upr.edu/index.php/dialogos/article/view/19296
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5122197
dc.descriptionIn the Discourse1 Part V, Descartes gives some empirical reasons against the possibility of explaining thought and language in mechanistic terms. In the light of the development of neuroscience, these arguments have led to some contemporary interpretations of Cartesian dualism which suggest that it was motivated by limitations in Descartes' mechanistic conception of physics. Some recent scholars maintain that Descartes was not able to see how the brain or the nervous system could generate all the complex responses necessary for the production of thought and language. As a consequence, Descartes remained a dualist.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedrases-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.upr.edu/index.php/dialogos/article/view/19296/16814
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceDiálogos; No. 78 (2001); 19-39en-US
dc.sourceDiálogos; Núm. 78 (2001); 19-39es-ES
dc.source2693-9339
dc.source0012-2122
dc.subjectCartesianen-US
dc.subjectDualismen-US
dc.subjectObjectionsen-US
dc.subjectCartesianoes-ES
dc.subjectDualismoes-ES
dc.subjectObjecioneses-ES
dc.titleCartesian Dualism: A Limited Vision? Sorne Objections and Repliesen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typetexten-US
dc.typetextoes-ES


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