Dynamic Resource Allocation Withself-|Interested Agents in the Upstream Oil & Gas Iindustry

dc.creatorSund, Knut Arne
dc.date2010-12-22
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-04T02:52:42Z
dc.date.available2022-11-04T02:52:42Z
dc.identifierhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/joscm/article/view/11167
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5071988
dc.descriptionThis paper analyzes resource allocation between principal-agent (and between agent-agent) in the upstream oil & gas industry. In the model, we incorporate the parties' preferences as we outline a principal-agent model. Further, we optimize the resource allocation between the parties as they are self-interested with the use of incentive-based contracts with risk and rewards. Our optimization determines that to realize the highest profit, the principal and the involved agents should avoid any agents' becoming dominant. Hence, the volume of sourced items from the agents should not vary too much. We further outline the on-boarding process of new agents in the network and how the network needs to compensate for the potential loss for some of the agents if the network should fulfill the incentive-compatibility condition.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherFGV EAESPen-US
dc.relationhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/joscm/article/view/11167/10137
dc.sourceJournal of Operations and Supply Chain Management; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2010): July - December; 78-97en-US
dc.sourceJournal of Operations and Supply Chain Management; v. 3 n. 2 (2010): July - December; 78-97pt-BR
dc.source1984-3046
dc.subjectResource allocationen-US
dc.subjectincentive-based contracten-US
dc.subjectmechanism design theoryen-US
dc.subjectprincipal-agent theoryen-US
dc.subjectoptimization.en-US
dc.titleDynamic Resource Allocation Withself-|Interested Agents in the Upstream Oil & Gas Iindustryen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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