Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatment

Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatment

dc.creatorRoth, Alvin E.
dc.creatorSotomayor, Marilda
dc.date1996-11-02
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T21:18:23Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T21:18:23Z
dc.identifierhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/bre/article/view/2873
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5047821
dc.descriptionWe present a unified treatment of a class of two-sided matching models that includes discrete models (such as the marriage model of Gale and Shapley) and continuous models (such as the assignmnent model of Shapley aud Shubik and the generalized assignment model of Demange aud Gale). In contrast with previous, treatments, the parallel conclusions for the two sets of models are derived here in the same way from the same assumptions. We show that the results ill question all follow closely from the assumptions that the core coincides with the core defined by weak domination. In the marriage model, the assumption of strict preferences causes these two sets to coincide, while in the continuous models the two sets coincide because agents have continuous preferences and prices can be adjusted continuously.en-US
dc.descriptionApresentamos um tratamento unificado de uma classe de modelos de matching de dois lados que inclui modelos discretos (tais como o modelo do casamento de Gale e Shapley) e os modelos contínuos (tais como o modelo de designação de Shapley e Shubik e o modelo de designação generalizado de Demange e Gale). Em contraste com os tratamentos anteriores, as conclusões paralelas para os dois conjuntos de modelos são derivadas aqui do mesmo modo e a partir das mesmas hipóteses. Mostramos que os resultados em questão seguem, praticamente, da hipótese de que o núcleo coincide com o núcleo definido por dominação fraca. No modelo do casamento a hipótese de que as preferências são estritas faz com que estes dois conjuntos coincidam enquanto nos modelos contínuos os dois conjuntos coincidem porque os agentes tem preferências contínuas e os preços podem ser ajustados continuamente.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherSociedade Brasileira de Econometriaen-US
dc.relationhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/bre/article/view/2873/1793
dc.sourceBrazilian Review of Econometrics; Vol. 16 No. 2 (1996); 1-24en-US
dc.sourceBrazilian Review of Econometrics; v. 16 n. 2 (1996); 1-24pt-BR
dc.source1980-2447
dc.subjectMatchingen-US
dc.subjectstable matchingen-US
dc.subjectcoreen-US
dc.subjectlatticeen-US
dc.subjectoptimal matchingen-US
dc.subjectC78en-US
dc.subjectMatchingpt-BR
dc.subjectstable matchingpt-BR
dc.subjectcorept-BR
dc.subjectlatticept-BR
dc.subjectoptimal matchingpt-BR
dc.subjectC78pt-BR
dc.titleStable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatmenten-US
dc.titleStable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatmentpt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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