Central Bank preferences and monetary rules under the inflation targeting regime in Brasil

Central Bank preferences and monetary rules under the inflation targeting regime in Brasil

dc.creatorAragón, Edilean Kleber da Silva Bejarano
dc.creatorPortugal, Marcelo Savino
dc.date2009-05-01
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T21:18:00Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T21:18:00Z
dc.identifierhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/bre/article/view/2697
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5047739
dc.descriptionThe estimated interest rate rules are reduced form equations and for that reason they do not directly reveal anything about the structural parameters of monetary policy. In this paper, we seek to further elucidate the Brazilian monetary policy under the inflation targeting regime by calibrating Central Bank preferences. More specifically, we calibrate the policymaker’s loss function by choosing the preference parameter values which minimize the deviation between the optimal and actual paths of the basic interest rate (Selic). Our results indicate that the Central Bank has adopted a flexible inflation target regime and placed some greater weight upon inflation stabilization. We also find out that the monetary authority’s concern with interest rate smoothing has been far deeper than with output stabilizationen-US
dc.descriptionThe estimated interest rate rules are reduced form equations and for that reason they do not directly reveal anything about the structural parameters of monetary policy. In this paper, we seek to further elucidate the Brazilian monetary policy under the inflation targeting regime by calibrating Central Bank preferences. More specifically, we calibrate the policymaker’s loss function by choosing the preference parameter values which minimize the deviation between the optimal and actual paths of the basic interest rate (Selic). Our results indicate that the Central Bank has adopted a flexible inflation target regime and placed some greater weight upon inflation stabilization. We also find out that the monetary authority’s concern with interest rate smoothing has been far deeper than with output stabilizationpt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherSociedade Brasileira de Econometriaen-US
dc.relationhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/bre/article/view/2697/1826
dc.sourceBrazilian Review of Econometrics; Vol. 29 No. 1 (2009); 79-109en-US
dc.sourceBrazilian Review of Econometrics; v. 29 n. 1 (2009); 79-109pt-BR
dc.source1980-2447
dc.subjectCentral Bank preferencesen-US
dc.subjectOptimal monetary policyen-US
dc.subjectInflation targetsen-US
dc.subjectC61en-US
dc.subjectE52en-US
dc.subjectE58en-US
dc.subjectCentral Bank preferencespt-BR
dc.subjectOptimal monetary policypt-BR
dc.subjectInflation targetspt-BR
dc.subjectC61pt-BR
dc.subjectE52pt-BR
dc.subjectE58pt-BR
dc.titleCentral Bank preferences and monetary rules under the inflation targeting regime in Brasilen-US
dc.titleCentral Bank preferences and monetary rules under the inflation targeting regime in Brasilpt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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