dc.creatorMoita, Rodrigo Menon
dc.creatorMonte, Daniel
dc.date2020-03-25
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:56:15Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:56:15Z
dc.identifierhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/article/view/76860
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5044258
dc.descriptionHydroelectric generation is the main source of energy production in manycountries. When firms operate in the same river, or in cascades, the outputof an upstream firm is the input of its downstream rival. We build a dynamicstochastic duopoly model of competition in cascades and show that thedecentralized market is inefficient when rain is frequent. However, at the critical times when rain is infrequent the market allocation isefficient. In an extension of our benchmark model, we show that regulatory intervention might be necessary if peak prices are sufficiently higher than off-peak prices. In such cases, upstream firms delay production in off-peak times, limiting their rivaldownstream generators' production in peak times.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEGV EPGEpt-BR
dc.relationhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/article/view/76860/77562
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2020 Revista Brasileira de Economiapt-BR
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; Vol. 74 No. 1 (2020): JAN-MAR; 49-63en-US
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; v. 74 n. 1 (2020): JAN-MAR; 49-63pt-BR
dc.source1806-9134
dc.source0034-7140
dc.subjectelectricity marketsen-US
dc.subjectdynamic gamesen-US
dc.subjecthydroelectric generationen-US
dc.titleHydroeletric Generators Competing in Cascadesen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeArticlesen-US
dc.typeArtigospt-BR


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