dc.creatorSilveira, Jaylson Jair da
dc.creatorLima, Gilberto Tadeu
dc.date2015-06-11
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:55:31Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:55:31Z
dc.identifierhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/article/view/21107
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5044148
dc.descriptionWe derive a best-reply monetary policy when the confidence by price setters on the monetary authority’s commitment to price level targeting is both incomplete and sticky. We find that complete confidence (or full credibility) is not a necessary condition for reaching a price level target. In fact, it is the reaching of a price level target for long enough that rather ensures the conquering of the greatest possible confidence. Evidently, this result has relevant implications for the conduct of monetary policy in pursuit of price stability.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherEGV EPGEpt-BR
dc.relationhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/article/view/21107/50324
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2015 Revista Brasileira de Economiapt-BR
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; Vol. 69 No. 2 (2015): Abr-Jun; 251-261en-US
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; v. 69 n. 2 (2015): Abr-Jun; 251-261pt-BR
dc.source1806-9134
dc.source0034-7140
dc.subjectprice level targetingpt-BR
dc.subjectbest-reply monetary policypt-BR
dc.subjectsticky confidencept-BR
dc.subjectevolutionary game.pt-BR
dc.titleConquering Credibility for Monetary Policy under Sticky Confidencept-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeArticlesen-US
dc.typeArtigospt-BR


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