dc.creatorVieira, Wilson da Cruz
dc.date2015-12-02
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:54:56Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:54:56Z
dc.identifierhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/article/view/7375
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5044016
dc.descriptionIn this article, we analyze the use of descending clock auctions in the implementation of a minimum pricing policy. This type of auction has been used by the Brazilian government policy of support for agricultural prices since 1997. We propose a clock auction model along the lines used by the Brazilian government and derive its main implications. Based on data from auctions already held and implications of the theoretical model, we conclude that the following factors are crucial to minimize the costs of implementing a minimum price policy via auctions: the choice of product to be auctioned, amount auctioned, reserve price, and the rules used in the implementation of the auction. pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherEGV EPGEpt-BR
dc.relationhttps://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/article/view/7375/56231
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; Vol. 69 No. 4 (2015): Out-Dez; 503-517en-US
dc.sourceRevista Brasileira de Economia; v. 69 n. 4 (2015): Out-Dez; 503-517pt-BR
dc.source1806-9134
dc.source0034-7140
dc.subjectAuctionspt-BR
dc.subjectagricultural policypt-BR
dc.subjectprice supportpt-BR
dc.subjectBrazilpt-BR
dc.titleAuctioning off Prizes for Agricultural Product Flow under a Policy of Minimum Pricespt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeArticlesen-US
dc.typeArtigospt-BR


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