Institutional Specialization

dc.contributorEscolas::EESP
dc.creatorGuimaraes, Bernardo
dc.creatorSheedy, Kevin D.
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-05T19:45:15Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:27:50Z
dc.date.available2021-07-05T19:45:15Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:27:50Z
dc.date.created2021-07-05T19:45:15Z
dc.date.issued2021-06
dc.identifierTD 545
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10438/30808
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5038884
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a theory of institutional specialization in which some countries uphold the rule of law while others choose extractive institutions, even when countries are ex-ante identical. The driving force of specialization is that for incumbents in each country, the first steps to the rule of law have the greatest cost. Good institutions require sharing power and rents, but in places where power is already shared broadly, each power base or branch of government supporting the institutions is individually less important and thus receives lower rents. Countries with diametrically opposed institutions have a symbiotic relationship in the world equilibrium. The transition from sail to steam-powered vessels in 19th-century trade provides suggestive evidence supporting the theory
dc.languageeng
dc.relationTextos para Discussão / Working Paper Series;TD 545
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.subjectRule of law
dc.subjectPower sharing
dc.subjectInternational trade
dc.subjectExtractive institutions
dc.subjectResource curse
dc.subjectPolitical economy
dc.titleInstitutional Specialization
dc.typeWorking Paper


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