Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment

dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorGonçalves, Carlos Eduardo Soares
dc.creatorGuimarães, Bernardo
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:36:44Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:26:28Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:36:44Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:26:28Z
dc.date.created2018-05-10T13:36:44Z
dc.date.issued2015-01
dc.identifier0022-1996
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23452
dc.identifier10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.11.008
dc.identifier000349884000006
dc.identifierguimaraes, bernardo/0000-0003-0098-2174
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5038447
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies fiscal policy in a model of sovereign debt and default A time inconsistency problem arises: since the price of past debt cannot be affected by current fiscal policy and governments cannot credibly commit to a certain path of tax rates, debtor countries choose suboptimally low fiscal adjustments. An international organization, capable of designing a contract that coaxes debtors into a tougher fiscal stance via the provision of cheap senior lending in times of crisis, can work as a commitment device and improve social welfare. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherElsevier Science Bv
dc.relationJournal of international economics
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectFiscal adjustment
dc.subjectSovereign debt
dc.subjectSovereign default
dc.subjectTime inconsistency
dc.subjectIMF
dc.titleSovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)


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