Centralized allocation in multiple markets

dc.contributorEscolas::EESP
dc.creatorMonte, Daniel
dc.creatorTumennasan, Norovsambuu
dc.date.accessioned2013-04-16T12:03:49Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:22:08Z
dc.date.available2013-04-16T12:03:49Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:22:08Z
dc.date.created2013-04-16T12:03:49Z
dc.date.issued2013-04-16
dc.identifierTD 322
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/10743
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5036995
dc.description.abstractWe study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, the solution of the joint al-location in multiple markets is significantly narrower than in the single-market case. Our result also applies to dynamic allocation problems. Finally, we provide conditions under which the solution of the single-market allocation coincides with the multiple-market case, and we apply this result to the study of the school choice problem with sibling priorities.
dc.languageeng
dc.relationTextos para discussão EESP;TD 322
dc.subjectMatching
dc.subjectGroup strategy-proofness
dc.subjectPareto efficiency
dc.titleCentralized allocation in multiple markets
dc.typeWorking Paper


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