Mechanism design and the collective approach to household behavior

dc.contributorEscolas::EPGE
dc.creatorCosta, Carlos Eugênio da
dc.creatorLima, Lucas Alves Estevam de
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-23T14:09:00Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:21:57Z
dc.date.available2019-08-23T14:09:00Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:21:57Z
dc.date.created2019-08-23T14:09:00Z
dc.date.issued2019-08-06
dc.identifier0104-8910
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10438/27929
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5036940
dc.description.abstractDo the Revelation and Taxation Principles hold for multi-person householDo the Revelation and Taxation Principles hold for multi-person households? We provide a positive answer to the former and a negative to the latter if the household decision process is such that no mechanism can lead to inefficient choices. This unconditional version of Chiappori’s (1988) collective approach, offers a household model which can be used in a standard mechanism design approach.ds? We provide a positive answer to the former and a negative to the latter if the household decision process is such that no mechanism can lead to inefficient choices. This unconditional version of Chiappori’s (1988) collective approach, offers a household model which can be used in a standard mechanism design approach.
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
dc.relationEnsaios Econômicos;808
dc.subjectFGV EPGE
dc.subjectFGV EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças
dc.subjectPrincípios da tributação
dc.titleMechanism design and the collective approach to household behavior
dc.typeWorking Paper


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