dc.contributorEscolas::EPGE
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorNovaes, Walter
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-29T13:41:37Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:16:12Z
dc.date.available2014-10-29T13:41:37Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:16:12Z
dc.date.created2014-10-29T13:41:37Z
dc.date.issued1999-07-08
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/12271
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5035000
dc.description.abstractLarge shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not necessarily have the same interests as minority shareholders. We show that bargaining problems Ied by the presence of muItipIe controlling shareholders protect minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems, however, prevent efficient decisions. By solving this trade-off we find that i) muItipIe controlling shareholders should be present in firms with Iarge costs of diIuting minority shareholders and in firms with Iarge financing requirements, ii) an optimal ownership structure requires the presence of a dass of shareholders - the minority shareholders - with no control over corporate decisions. Evidence on the ownership structure of dose corporations in the V.S. is consistent with our model.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
dc.relationSeminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE
dc.rightsTodo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis
dc.titleMultiple large shareholders in corporate governance
dc.typeWorking Paper


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