All-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries

dc.contributorEscolas::EPGE
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorParreiras, Sérgio O.
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-25T12:53:29Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:15:41Z
dc.date.available2014-11-25T12:53:29Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:15:41Z
dc.date.created2014-11-25T12:53:29Z
dc.date.issued2004-03-18
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/12597
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5034814
dc.description.abstractWe study N-bidders, asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information. First, we solve for the equilibrium of a parametric model. Each bidder’s valuation is independently drawn from an uniform [0, αi] where the parameter αi may vary across bidders. In this game, asymmetries are exogenously given. Next, a two-stage game where asymmetries are endogenously generated is studied. At the first stage, each bidder chooses the level of an observable, costly, value-enhancing action. The second stage is the bidding sub-game, whose equilibrium is simply the equilibrium of the, previously analyzed, game with exogenous asymmetries. Finally, natural applications of the all pay-auction in the context of political lobbying are considered: the effects of excluding bidders, as well as, the impact of caps on bids.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
dc.relationSeminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE
dc.rightsTodo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis
dc.titleAll-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries
dc.typeWorking Paper


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