First-price auctions without affiliation

dc.contributorEscolas::EPGE
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorMonteiro, P. K.
dc.creatorMoreira, Humberto Ataíde
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-25T18:23:42Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:13:05Z
dc.date.available2018-10-25T18:23:42Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:13:05Z
dc.date.created2018-10-25T18:23:42Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier0165-1765
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/25314
dc.identifier10.1016/j.econlet.2005.08.006
dc.identifier2-s2.0-33645730754
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5033916
dc.description.abstractWe give conditions for equilibrium existence in private value, symmetric, first-price auctions without affiliation assumptions. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.languageeng
dc.relationEconomics Letters
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectAffiliation
dc.subjectFirst-Price Auction
dc.titleFirst-price auctions without affiliation
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)


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