Financial incentives and loan officer behavior: multitasking and allocation of effort under an incomplete contract
dc.contributor | Demais unidades::RPCA | |
dc.creator | Behr, Patrick Gottfried | |
dc.creator | Drexler, Alejandro | |
dc.creator | Gropp, Reint | |
dc.creator | Guettler, Andre | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T16:54:56Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-11-03T20:10:00Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T16:54:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-11-03T20:10:00Z | |
dc.date.created | 2017-01-31T16:54:56Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/17814 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5032815 | |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the three main activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, origination, and screening. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonus, they increase monitoring and origination, but not screening effort. On the other hand, having lost a bonus in the previous period does not entail higher effort. We document unintended consequences of the incentive contract showing the incompleteness of such contracts. | |
dc.language | eng | |
dc.publisher | EBAPE - Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas | |
dc.subject | Loan officer | |
dc.subject | Incentives | |
dc.subject | Monitoring | |
dc.subject | Screening | |
dc.subject | Loan origination | |
dc.title | Financial incentives and loan officer behavior: multitasking and allocation of effort under an incomplete contract | |
dc.type | Paper |