dc.contributorAmbrosi De la Cadena, Marco Antonio
dc.creatorMárquez Márquez, Daniel Hernán
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-17T11:53:11Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-20T20:47:52Z
dc.date.available2018-10-17T11:53:11Z
dc.date.available2022-10-20T20:47:52Z
dc.date.created2018-10-17T11:53:11Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifierhttp://dspace.ucuenca.edu.ec/handle/123456789/31400
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4598941
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes and synthesizes several philosophical conceptions that revolve around the possibility and impossibility of defining moral terms from a naturalistic objectivist perspective that is, reducing moral terms to natural events. It discusses and argues for and against subjectivism, relativism and moral objectivism. In addition, the pros and cons of the capture or not of the argument of the open question OQA proposed and developed by Moore is analyzed and evaluated. Also, an exhaustive analysis is made about the naturalistic fallacy and a logical argument is developed that shows the legality of making ethical conclusions from unethical statements, so it is concluded that between the factual and normative there is a link that is not explicit, but implicit. Finally, the author defends his position in favor of a naturalistic objectivism as an ideal and fairer way for humans, either individually or collectively, to resolve or propose solutions to moral problems. The author makes a brief analysis and shows the possibilities and difficulties around the thought of Moore, non-naturalist and Jackson, naturalist.
dc.languagespa
dc.relationTF;128
dc.subjectFilosofia
dc.subjectSubjetivismo Moral
dc.subjectObjetivismo Moral
dc.subjectFalacia Naturalista
dc.subjectObjetivismo
dc.subjectNaturalismo
dc.titleAnálisis de la réplica de Frank Jackson a los argumentos antinaturalistas de G. E. Moore
dc.typebachelorThesis


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